DALZELL, District Judge.
This consolidated matter has its genesis in disputes between a parent, B.K., and her now twenty-year-old special education-eligible child I.K.'s (collectively, "plaintiff" or "B.K.") former school district,
In 2012, following a tortured history and narrative of inter-party communications at the administrative and federal court levels, Hearing Officer Linda M. Valentini, Psy. D., CHO ("hearing officer") issued a final decision on substantive grounds that reopened a previously closed due process complaint and ultimately reached the merits of I.K.'s IDEA claims.
Pending are the District's motion to supplement the administrative record and three dispositive motions. B.K. and the District filed what collectively function as cross appeals of the hearing officer's 2011 and 2012 Decisions below. B.K. also filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the discrimination claims that are still pending in this case. On August 5, 2013, we convened an evidentiary hearing to assist us in deciding the District's motion to supplement the record.
For the reasons detailed below, we will grant in part and deny in part the District's motion to supplement the administrative record and motion for summary judgment. We conclude that although no valid settlement agreement exists between the parties, the District has nevertheless succeeded on its equitable claim that promissory estoppel makes B.K.'s promises to settle I.K.'s IDEA and discrimination claims enforceable under the augmented record. Therefore, the District is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the waiver and release — the affirmative defenses it pled in its answer to B.K.'s complaint in C.A. No. 12-4066. We therefore affirm the hearing officer's 2011 decision but vacate her 2012 decision in its entirety. Because we conclude that B.K. has waived and/or released the District from liability for the IDEA and discrimination claims she advances in her complaint, we are obliged to deny as moot B.K.'s motion for judgment on the administrative record and motion for partial summary judgment on the discrimination claims.
The District's motion for summary judgment takes issue with the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law to the extent she (1) failed to find the existence of a settlement agreement between the parties in July of 2009, (2) lacked authority to issue her April 2012 decision in light of our remand Order, (3) failed to entertain the District's promissory estoppel claim, and, assuming the hearing officer was justified in reaching the merits of B.K.'s claims, she (4) erred in her merits determination. The District's motion for summary judgment seeks an Order "reversing the Hearing Officer's July 8, 2011 ruling denying the existence of a settlement agreement between the parties." The District also seeks reversal of the hearing officer's April 18, 2012 ruling on the substance of Plaintiff's claims in its entirety. District MSJ 4.
Unsurprisingly, B.K.'s response contends that the hearing officer did not err in finding that no settlement agreement existed between the parties. B.K. asserts that the hearing officer had the authority to issue her April 2012 Decision. Although B.K. responded to the District's unclean hands claim, her response (oddly) fails to acknowledge the District's estoppel argument. And, but for one aspect of her merits determination, B.K. contends that the hearing officer's 2012 Decision should be affirmed in full and the District's motion for summary judgment on the discrimination claims should be denied.
The parties' IDEA claims comprise what are effectively cross-appeals of the hearing officer's 2011 and 2012 decisions. Since the hearing officer's final 2012 Decision addressed on substantive grounds "whether [I.K.] received a free appropriate public education'", 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i), and denied the parties portions of the relief that each of them sought, they are both "aggrieved by the findings and decision" and thus they have a "right to bring a civil action ... in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy". Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). In light of our consolidation of four civil actions — C.A. Nos. 12-4066, 12-4033, 11-6040, and 10-4397 — we will construe all of the parties' claims of error in the hearing officer's decisions below as if they had raised them collectively in omnibus cross-appeals.
As to the federal discrimination claims under Section 504 and the ADA, we have general federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The District's motion for summary judgment takes issue with the hearing officer's conclusion of law in her July 8, 2011 Decision, ODR #00803/09-10 KE ("the 2011 Decision"), that the parties failed to enter into an enforceable contract in July of 2009 because their alleged agreement lacked consideration. We will begin with a survey of the hearing officer's findings of fact pertinent to this issue and we will canvass other facts relevant to the overall procedural history of this controversy.
We proceed under the prescribed modified de novo standard of review under which must "give `due weight' to the findings of the state hearing officer.... [and consider f]actual findings from the administrative proceedings ... to be considered prima facie correct." Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If we choose to reject the hearing officer's factual findings, we must explain why we do. Id. "Within the confines of these standards, [we are] authorized to make findings based on the preponderance of the evidence and grant the relief [we] deem[] appropriate." D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ, 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) (iii); see also Shore Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir.2004) (describing a district court's burden as "unusual" in that it must make its own findings by a preponderance of the evidence, but nevertheless afford "due weight" to the administrative officer's determinations). We have plenary review of the hearing officer's legal conclusions and the standards she applied in deciding the claims before her. D.S., 602 F.3d at 564.
Giving the hearing officer's factual findings the due weight they deserve under
As will be seen, the procedural history of this controversy has been long and complex. Regrettably, we must rehearse it in detail here.
On June 5, 2010, the hearing officer denied B.K.'s request to reopen the 2009 administrative action that had been dismissed by another hearing officer. In her Decision, Hearing Officer Valentini granted the District's earlier motion to dismiss because the same matter had been dismissed by the previous hearing officer, the Parent had not taken a timely appeal of that hearing officer's dismissal order, and the hearing would involve a determination of whether an agreement existed, an issue the hearing officer believed she lacked the jurisdiction to decide. H1 Ex. 4 (2011 Decision) ¶ 27.
On October 15, 2010, I.K., by and through his parent and educational decisionmaker, B.K., filed Civil Action No. 10-4397 ("the 2010 action") against the District as an appeal from the hearing officer's June 5, 2010 Decision.
Acting pursuant to our remand Order, Hearing Officer Valentini heard the parties' evidence over the course of two days. On July 8, 2011, she issued her 2011 Decision, articulated twenty-seven findings of fact, and concluded that "no settlement agreement exists between the parties." H1 Ex. 4 (2011 Decision) at 13. Though the School District raised a promissory estoppel claim in its written closing argument before the hearing officer in the proceedings related to the 2011 Decision, H1 Ex. 5 at 22, her 2011 Decision failed to address this claim.
On August 30, 2011, within the ninety-day period to file a federal action challenging a hearing officer's ruling in an IDEIA matter, the District initiated Civil Action No. 11-6040 seeking primarily to "[r]eview and reverse the Hearing Officer's order dated July 8, 2011" and "[u]phold the enforceability of the October 15, 2009 written settlement agreement, including Parent's release of all claims as set forth therein". Civ. Action No. 11-6040, Complaint at 25 ("the 2011 action").
On September 19, 2011, after the District had initiated the suit before us, it moved before the hearing officer to dismiss B.K.'s second administrative proceeding in light of the hearing officer's intimation that she would allow the second due process complaint to proceed as if the first-filed action had not been dismissed. In its memorandum of law in support of its motion, the District once again contended that B.K.'s claims were barred by promissory estoppel because "the District acted in reliance upon the representations made by Parent and her attorney that the matter had been resolved." H1 Ex. 3 at 17. The hearing officer denied the District's motion without explanation, id. Ex. 2, thus implicitly rejecting the District's estoppel argument without reaching it.
The hearing officer then set a merits determination and scheduled hearings. After several days of evidence were presented to the hearing officer in mid-March of 2012, the parties filed post-hearing submissions. H2 Exs. 3-4. In the District's written closing, it raised the promissory estoppel claim for a third time. Id. Ex. 4 at 56-58.
While the parties were engaged in these administrative proceedings, the District filed before us its motion to strike the administrative record, or, in the alternative, motion to supplement the administrative record with Judith A. Gran, Esq.'s (B.K.'s former attorney) testimony about a September 28, 2009 evening conversation that occurred between Gran and B.K. on B.K.'s sister's porch. Though we denied that motion without prejudice in light of the parties' lack of opposition to a mediation before the Honorable Jacob P. Hart, the proceedings before us in C.A. No. 11-6040 the 2011 action stalled after the mediation with Judge Hart failed, but the parties continued to actively litigate the merits of B.K.'s claims before the hearing officer.
On April 18, 2012, the hearing officer issued a Decision on the merits of I.K.'s IDEA and Section 504 claims following seven days of testimony and the introduction of evidence ("the 2012 Decision").
Both parties filed new complaints — Civil Action Nos. 12-4033 and 12-4066 — which together constitute cross-appeals of different aspects of the 2012 Decision. B.K.'s complaint also raised discrimination claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. We then consolidated all four civil actions into Civil Action No. 12-4066.
Prior to the Rule 16 conference we had scheduled for October 3, 2012, the District renewed its motion to strike portions of the administrative record, or, in the alternative, to supplement the administrative record. Following that conference we directed the parties to "COMPLETE discovery" by November 9, 2012 and "FILE any motions for summary judgment" by November 19, 2012. Oct. 3, 2012 Order. B.K. filed a timely answer to the District's motion.
In accordance with our Order, the District filed a motion for summary judgment requesting that we reverse the hearing officer's 2011 and 2012 Decisions (essentially granting it the relief it sought in Civil Action Nos. 11-6040 and 11-4033) and dismissing plaintiff's complaint in Civil Action No. 12-4066. B.K. filed what she styled a "motion for judgment on the administrative record", appealing one aspect of the hearing officer's 2012 Decision on the merits. B.K. also filed a motion for partial summary judgment on her son's discrimination claims seeking judgment on the issue of liability only.
After the parties completed discovery and submitted fully-briefed motions for summary judgment, we denied in part and denied as moot in part the District's motion to strike portions of the administrative record, or, in the alternative, motion to supplement the administrative record. We held that we lacked the authority to delete part of the administrative record in an IDEA proceeding and denied as moot the District's request to supplement the administrative record because, despite affording it time to conduct discovery, it failed to proffer any "additional evidence" for our consideration.
The District filed a motion for reconsideration of our Order contending, among other things, that "it had no ability to seek [certain] testimony or engage in any `discovery' on the IDEA claims absent a specific Court grant of such authority." Mot. for Reconsideration.
The next day, and before B.K. responded, we granted the District's motion because "our review of our notes from the Rule 16 conference ... appear[ed] to confirm some ambiguity about the scope of allowable discovery, and though the District should have sought clarification of our earlier Scheduling Order before dispositive motions were filed, we [saw] how the District read our instruction obliging the parties to `COMPLETE discovery' by November 9, 2012, as permitt[ing] discovery on Plaintiffs' discrimination claims alone, and not on the parties' IDEA claims, as the latter claims are generally determined on the administrative record and not part of an ordinary discovery process". May 9, 2013 Order ¶ (e) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, we granted the District leave to depose Judith A. Gran, Esq., plaintiff's former counsel.
B.K. filed a motion for "modification" of our May 9, 2013 Order that amounted to a motion for reconsideration. We denied
On May 30, 2013, the parties filed supplemental briefing on the issue of whether we should hear this additional evidence and what, if any, import we should ascribe to it. On June 14, 2013, we sua sponte scheduled an evidentiary hearing so that Gran and B.K. could present testimony about their September 28, 2009 conversation. On August 5, 2013, we convened an evidentiary hearing at which Gran and B.K. testified.
The parties do not dispute that the hearing officer's 2011 Decision substantially complied with the narrow scope of our remand Order, but they disagree over the hearing officer's legal conclusion over which we exercise plenary review. For the reasons that follow, we decline to depart from the hearing officer's factual findings as they bear on the issue of whether the parties' July 2009 "agreement" was supported by consideration. We conclude that the parties did not enter into a valid settlement agreement in July of 2009 because their agreement at that time lacked consideration.
In the hearing officer's 2011 Decision, she concluded that "[t]he Parent at no time extended the Considerations
Though the District's argument (unhelpfully) omits any citations to the record and fails to enumerate the facts as we directed it to do, we nevertheless construe its motion as inviting us to depart from the hearing officer's legal conclusions and find
Specifically, the District contends that at the July 28, 2009 meeting,
District MSJ 7-8 (footnote four omitted).
A review of the evidence cited above shows that the scope of the release was unclear when the parties met on July 28, 2009. Ms. Habert's handwritten note states only "ok ... release through conclusion of 2009-10 school year including", but it stops short of saying what is actually included in the release. H1 SD-1. The District also cites Habert's testimony that: (1) B.K. and Gran "went over each [of the five items, including the release]. And when they said yes to each one, I wrote okay next to it", H1 NT 130:2-5; (2) "I wrote okay down ... as [B.K.] indicated her as[s]ent to that item to confirm it" in
While we have no reason to dispute this sequence of events, the District points to no clarifying evidence that addresses the hearing officer's primary concern: "[t]he handwritten notes reflecting some basic items ... do not reflect that there was specific and detailed discussion about elements that would be put into a written agreement.... Neither the Parent nor her former attorney recalled that conditions such as [a release of civil rights claims] were examined." H1 Ex. 4 (2011 Decision) ¶ 6.
We agree with the hearing officer that the record is ambiguous as to what precisely B.K. agreed to release at the July 28, 2009 meeting. Although Ms. Habert's testimony below suggests that she read her own terse handwritten note as constituting an agreement to "release ... parental claims through the '09/'10 school year", it is notable that she merely said "Yes" in response to the District lawyer's deposition question. H1 NT 77:7-17. Moreover, the District points to no other record evidence to support the inference that B.K. knew just what she was releasing at the July 28, 2009 meeting.
Under Pennsylvania law, if "the extent of the release to be given in exchange for a settlement ... was never agreed upon, ... consideration was thus lacking in the agreement". Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 785 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006); see also Lombardo v. Gasparini Excavating Co., 385 Pa. 388, 123 A.2d 663, 666 (1956) (holding that "in order for there to be an enforceable contract, the nature and extent of its obligation must be certain; the parties themselves must agree upon the material and necessary details of the bargain" and holding that under the facts that a contract was not supported by consideration in part because "the alleged contract was much too indefinite" because "there was no agreement or even discussion as to any of the essential terms of the alleged bargain such as time or manner of performance, price to be paid, or the like").
Because we agree with the hearing officer that for lack of consideration no enforceable settlement agreement existed between the parties, we will not disturb her July 2011 decision.
The District contends that the hearing officer lacked authority to take further action after she complied with the narrow scope of our remand order. Even though our remand order was silent as to how the hearing officer should proceed after resolving the issue we remanded to her, we hold that she acted within the scope of her authority under the IDEA to act as she did.
Notably, the District does not point to — and we cannot find — any provision in the IDEA that strips the hearing officer of the authority to take further action consistent with her power under federal and state law after resolving a narrow issue on remand that does not conclusively resolve the case.
Implicit in both the District's argument that the hearing officer lacked authority to proceed beyond the scope of our remand order and its decision to initiate the 2011 action is the assumption that we had jurisdiction to review the hearing officer's 2011 Decision before she took any further administrative action. We hold that the District's assumption is mistaken.
We lacked jurisdiction to review the hearing officer's July 2011 Decision until she rendered her final 2012 "decision" on "substantive grounds" that addressed "whether the child [I.K.] received a free appropriate public education'". § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i); § 1415(i)(1)(A). Whether I.K. received a FAPE was the precise question left un answered by the hearing officer's 2011 Decision.
Even assuming that the District's 2011 civil action could be construed as some form of an interlocutory collateral challenge, the hearing officer's decision was not tantamount to an "appealable" collateral order because it failed to resolve an issue that would have been effectively unreviewable after a final decision — indeed, our actions here are testament to the reviewability of that issue at a time following her final merits-based decision. See also M.L. v. Frisco Ind. Sch. Dist., 451 Fed. Appx. 424, 426, 428 (5th Cir.2011) ("There is no statutory provision for a suit seeking interlocutory review of preliminary findings and decisions of the hearing officer" in an IDEA case, nor are certain threshold decisions appealable collateral orders); Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 416, 423 (3d Cir.1996) ("Congress permitted judicial challenges of [certain] orders ... only to those ... who have exhausted their administrative remedies.... [The Court of Appeals] refused to condone plaintiffs' attempted end-run around the administrative
Thus, under the facts here, before the hearing officer issued of a final decision she was the only arbiter authorized by Congress and state law to exercise any authority over this case. If she had failed to act as she did, this matter might well have floated in the air of uncertainty about who should act next.
As already noted, we remanded the matter to the hearing officer to determine "whether a valid settlement agreement exists", I.K., 2011 WL 1042311, at *5, and her July 2011 Decision focused solely on the issue of whether an enforceable contract existed between the parties. Logically,
Curiously, the parties address the District's promissory estoppel claim as if it were relevant to our review of the hearing officer's July 2011 Decision. This fundamentally misconstrues the estoppel claim. The parties' submissions fail to apprehend that estoppel is an equitable doctrine that makes promises that are otherwise unsupported by consideration enforceable so as to avoid injustice. The doctrine stops short of creating a contract governed by law — the precise issue the hearing officer correctly resolved in her 2011 Decision. Put another way, the estoppel issue was beyond the scope of our remand order.
Despite the parties' confusion about the relationship between the estoppel claim and our remand order, there is no doubt that the District properly presented its estoppel claim to the hearing officer below on at least two occasions. Though the hearing officer did not expressly entertain the District's estoppel argument,
The District filed a motion to strike portions of the administrative record, or, in the alternative, motion to supplement the administrative record. In essence, the motion seeks to augment the administrative record with the testimony of Judith Gran, Esq., B.K.'s original attorney in this matter.
We now conclude that it is essential to the full development of the factual record in this case — not to mention our overarching truth-seeking duty — that we supplement the administrative record with Gran's August 5, 2013 testimony about the September 28, 2009 conversation that she had with B.K. So as to ensure the fair development of this record, we will also augment the record with B.K.'s August 5, 2013 rebuttal testimony.
When Congress enacted the IDEA, it provided that "[i]n any action brought under this paragraph, the court ... shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party". 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(c)(ii). Our Court of Appeals has recently reaffirmed its longstanding teaching that
D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 253 (3d Cir.2012).
The District's supplemental evidence unquestionably satisfies our Court of Appeals's standard for record supplementation, and we will grant its motion. Gran's now unfettered-by-privilege testimony about her September 28, 2009 conversation with B.K. is crucial to the question of whether B.K.'s conduct supports a judicial determination that B.K. is now estopped from avoiding certain promises she made to the District in the absence of any binding agreement.
B.K. contends that the District's failure to re call Gran at the administrative hearing should bar it from supplementing the record here. As a threshold matter, B.K. makes an argument about the procedure that the parties should have followed below but she fails to direct us to any authority
We are also not swayed by B.K.'s argument that the District's failure to abide by the discovery timeline should foreclose the expansion of the record.
The record having now been developed both by the hearing officer below and by us at the August 5, 2013 evidentiary hearing,
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that:
Crouse, 745 A.2d at 610 (internal quotation marks omitted). As to the first and second elements, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that "[w]hen promissory estoppel is pled as a theory of recovery, a cause of action will lie if the plaintiff relies on the intentional or negligent representations of another party." Thomas v. E.B. Jermyn Lodge No. 2, 693 A.2d 974, 978 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997). Regarding the "avoid injustice" element, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that this is a fact-intensive inquiry:
Thatcher's Drug Store of W. Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc., 535 Pa. 469, 636 A.2d 156, 160 (1994) (alterations in original) (quoting Restatement (Second) Contracts § 90, comment b). "A party asserting a claim of [promissory] estoppel has the burden of establishing all the essential elements", id., and it "may be invoked only in those cases where all the elements of a true estoppel are present, for if it is loosely applied any promise, regardless of the complete absence of consideration, would be enforceable." Stelmack v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 339 Pa. 410, 14 A.2d 127, 129 (1940).
Here, the District has carried its burden of establishing its promissory estoppel, or detrimental reliance, as it stated this claim in paragraphs 69-71 of its 2011 complaint. Matarazzo v. Millers Mut. Grp., Inc., 927 A.2d 689, 692 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2007).
Though the hearing officer's 2011 Decision included many findings of fact pertinent to our disposition of the estoppel claim, her cursory treatment of certain of the record facts, and repeated failure to reach the District's estoppel claim, fortifies our decision to revisit and augment her factual findings so that they can assist us in at last resolving the District's estoppel claim. We will now recite the hearing officer's findings of fact that are relevant to our resolution of this estoppel claim and, where necessary, we will augment these findings with citations to the administrative and newly-augmented August 5, 2013 record. All of our findings of fact are made pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C),
At the July 28, 2009 meeting,
We must first address a keystone issue of credibility that will drive our findings of fact and conclusions of law on the District's
For example, B.K. testified that Ms. Gran had not communicated with her, overlooking the uncontested fact that Ms. Gran, frustrated at the mother's failure to respond to multiple emails and voicemails, took it upon herself to drive twenty-five minutes on the evening of September 28, 2009 to wait for the mother's return on the porch of the mother's sister's house. B.K.'s testimony as to her lawyer's failure to communicate is thus revealed, by Ms. Gran's undisputed actions that night, to be a fantasy at best.
Indeed, through her testimony Ms. Gran demonstrated that the impressive career described in her c.v. (Aug. 5, 2013 Def. Ex. 1) understates what a careful, methodical, and committed advocate she is for all her clients — including I.K. and his mother. We therefore accept Ms. Gran's testimony in toto and reject as incredible the mother's contrary statements.
Though our credibility determinations here are supplemented in part by the hearing officer's credibility determinations below, it bears noting that our rejection of B.K.'s testimony is in some tension with the hearing officer's views on this subject. To the extent that tension exists, we reject the hearing officer's determinations and substitute our own.
In the hearing officer's 2011 Decision, she concluded that:
2011 Decision 10-11 (emphasis added).
On a related note, the hearing officer found as fact that "the Parent is unwilling to release the District from civil rights claims and this position primarily underlies her rejection of the proposed agreement." H1 SD-4 (2011 Decision) at ¶ 23.
To be sure, the hearing officer's credibility determinations and finding of fact noted above suggest that if B.K. sincerely intended to preserve her right to pursue discrimination claims, the more "logical" plan would have involved a "timely, firm, and clear rejection of the District's offer from the beginning" so as to signal to others her subjective beliefs. Id. at 11. But because the hearing officer's credibility determination and finding of facts did not include the recently admitted September 28, 2009 conversation evidence we heard at the August 5, 2013 hearing because B.K. had ambushed Gran before her testimony and after Gran left the hearing, those determinations have now been superseded by the truth.
Thus, we find that B.K. in fact authorized Gran to communicate her acceptance of the money and waiver/release terms to the District on September 28, 2009. B.K.'s direction to her attorney authorizing this affirmative representation to the District, the subsequent communications between the parties, and B.K.'s failure to raise any objection to these terms for nearly seven months fatally undermines the hearing officer's credibility determination of B.K. based on the corrupted and truncated record before her.
Moreover, we are especially unconvinced by B.K.'s testimony both before the hearing officer in 2011, H1 NT 411-412, and us at the August 5, 2013 hearing, Aug. 5, 2013 NT 63-64, that she told Gran at their September 28, 2009 meeting that B.K. would not sign away her son's civil rights. This contrasts with Gran's credible testimony that B.K. informed her that she would agree to the terms of a settlement as they had discussed it on the porch that night. Ms. Gran's testimony is documented by the email she sent to the District's counsel that very night. Aug. 5, 2013 Def. Ex. 3 (email sent 11:48 p.m. Sept. 28, 2009) (also appears in the administrative record at H1 SD-9).
As will be seen, as supplemented by the whole truth revealed on August 5, the hearing officer's reasoning confirms the District's promissory estoppel claim to the
As held above, we credit in toto Gran's testimony that B.K. authorized her to communicate to the District her promise to homeschool her child and accept the financial terms of the three draft agreements she reviewed in exchange for a waiver and release of all claims against the District. Aug, 5, 2013 NT 20:5-11; 27:2-5. At bottom, the substance of B.K.'s "promise" is embodied in Gran's authorized September 28, 2009 draft sent to both B.K. and the District at about the same time. Indeed, B.K.'s conduct confirmed her adherence to the promise of home schooling her child. B.K. did not (and has not) sent I.K. back to the Haverford School District since March of 2009 — throughout the pendency of the parties' discussions and lengthy periods of B.K.'s silence. B.K. expressed no concern about the waiver terms or the amount of money sought until nearly seven months after the July 28, 2009 meeting and only after new counsel took control of her case.
At bottom, B.K.'s words and deeds unambiguously communicated to the District that the negotiated terms were acceptable to her and her failure to register any objection for nearly seven months — whether because she was ambivalent, negligent, or overwhelmed — reasonably led the District to conclude, as the hearing officer found below, that the parties had resolved the case. Moreover, Gran's able counsel, and her good faith representations to the District, could have only fortified the District's reasonable belief that B.K. had agreed to the terms embodied in the draft agreements. Whatever motivated B.K.'s silence does not change the fact that it contrasted with her zeal for her son such that the District could only reasonably believe the matter had at long last resolved.
Second, the District here refrained from initiating truancy proceedings against plaintiff in reliance on B.K.'s promise to home school I.K. in exchange for money and a release of any claims against it. The District's correspondence demonstrates that it did not initiate any truancy action against the mother for failing to send I.K. to school after March of 2009 in reliance upon the eloquence of B.K.'s silence in this context. Indeed, the District, in fulfilling its duty to either approve a home school plan or initiate truancy proceedings against I.K., inquired as to B.K.'s intentions regarding settlement in November 16, 2009 — nearly four months after the July 28, 2009 meeting. H1 SD-14 at 1 (The District's attorney, Natalie Habert's November 16, 2009 email Ms. Gran) ("I am... concerned because [I.K.] has not attended school in the District since his mother withdrew him last spring, but [B.K.] has neither filed a home school plan for approval by the District nor signed the written Settlement Agreement to allow funding of the Special Education Trust. I appreciate hearing from you on this at your earliest convenience, so that the District can make a decision about whether it is compelled to investigate [I.K.'s] absence from school under the obligations placed upon it by the school attendance and truancy laws.").
Pennsylvania's compulsory education law, 24 Pa. Stat. § 13-1333(a)(1), provides, in part, that:
Section 13-1333(d) further provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to apply to a parent, guardian or person in parental relation whose child or children are in a home education program under section 1327.1." School districts are also "responsible for administering the individual school systems and, to that end, may adopt such reasonable rules and regulations as are necessary and proper for the management of school affairs", including truancy policies. See Pennsylvania v. Hall, 309 Pa.Super. 407, 455 A.2d 674, 676 (1983).
Thus, if B.K. was not educating her child under 24 Pa. Stat. § 13-1327.1 as she claimed to want to do as early as the July 28, 2009 meeting — and in fact appeared to be doing since March of 2009 — she risked "fail[ing] to take reasonable steps to ensure her child's attendance at school", United States v. Jackson, 169 Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir.2006) (citing § 13-1333), and thereby exposed herself to § 13-1333 sanctions. See also 24 Pa. Stat. § 13-1327(d) (obliging parents of children subject to the IDEA who are homeschooling their children to proceed according to an approved "program" or risk violating the compulsory education law).
When the District relied on B.K.'s failure to send I.K. to its schools, it exposed itself to the risk the Commonwealth would hold it was shirking its obligations to "to maintain a thorough and efficient system of public education." Hall, 455 A.2d at 676 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, of which § 13-1333 is a part, imposes penalties on "[a]ny district superintendent, secretary of the board of school directors, attendance officer, or teacher of any public... school ... who willfully refuses or neglects to comply with the provisions of this act". 24 Pa. Stat. § 13-1355. More pungently, the Pennsylvania Secretary of the Department of Education can withhold the Commonwealth's appropriations to school districts that fail to comply with their obligations under the compulsory education act. See 24 Pa. Stat. § 13-1357; cf. Pennsylvania v. Edsall, 13 Pa. D. 509, 1903 WL 2585, at *3 (Ct. of Quarter Sessions of the Peace of PA 1903) (noting that an ancestor compulsory education law "gives notice that part of the state appropriations are to be withheld from school districts that do not enforce its provisions") (emphasis in original). Thus, the District imperiled state funding for its educational programs if it without ground relied upon B.K.'s representations that I.K. would be homeschooled — to say nothing of exposing District officials to personal liability. Of course, the District offered a $50,000 subsidy for I.K.'s homeschooling and agreed to reimburse B.K. for $4,000 more.
Finally, we avoid injustice here only if we enforce B.K.'s promise to accept the homeschool, money, and release terms here. "Congress' central goal in enacting the IDEA was to ensure that each child with disabilities has access to a program that is tailored to his or her changing needs and designed to achieve educational progress", Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir.1995) (internal quotations omitted). Here, enforcing B.K.'s representations to the District will
We also do not find that enforcing B.K.'s promises would work an injustice to B.K. herself under these circumstances because her interests, as the complaint's caption suggests, are secondary to her son's. Though we are sympathetic to the challenges this mother faces in educating her special needs child, the principles of justice are only advanced under the IDEA if we hold her accountable for her promises to a publicly-funded school district that guarantees generous sums to fund a special needs child's education.
Moreover, the enforcement of B.K.'s promise avoids the substantial injustice that would befall the District as a result of its reasonable reliance on that promise. Months went by in 2009 and 2010 without B.K. (or either of her two attorneys on her behalf) registering objection to the homeschooling, financial, and waiver/release terms in the agreement drafts that the parties exchanged on at least four occasions in August, September, and October of 2009. B.K.'s silence about her intention to sign the agreement (or not), in the face of the District's repeated inquiries, and her decision not to send I.K. back to the District schools in the interim, gave the District the unambiguous reasonable view that the matter was resolved. To allow B.K.'s late-in-the-game change of heart to prevail over the District's earnest efforts to resolve this matter — and to equip B.K. with significant funds to educate I.K. — would thwart the District in its good faith effort to compromise with B.K. to resolve the IDEA claims. Cf. D.R. by M.R. v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 896, 901 & n. 3 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that when parties voluntarily agree to settle claims, and, as here, "there is no contention ... that the settlement agreement violated federal law", the agreement will be enforced because "a decision that would allow parents to void settlement agreements when they become unpalatable would work a significant deterrence contrary to the federal policy of encouraging settlement agreements").
Consequently, although there is no valid settlement agreement between the parties, the District is entitled to summary judgment on its promissory estoppel claim because B.K.'s words and deeds in 2009 and 2010 led it reasonably to believe and act as if the parties had resolved their dispute and agreed to terms and waiver/release of certain claims.
Although no enforceable contract existed, our conclusion that B.K. is estopped from avoiding her promises to the District "implies a contract in law where no contract exists in fact", 28 Am.Jur. Estoppel and Waiver § 54 n. 7 & accompanying text (2d ed. current through Aug. 2013). Our enterprise of identifying B.K.'s promises to the District is made easier by the existence of contractual language upon which the parties acted in reliance, and it is to this language that we will soon turn.
The District contends that an enforceable waiver and release mandate summary judgment in its favor on B.K.'s discrimination claims. B.K. did not respond to this argument. Though we cannot grant summary judgment motions as uncontested, see Loc. R. Civ. P. 7.1(c), we will reach the merits of the District's motion here and grant it on the basis of the District's affirmative defense. Because the District cited the waiver and release as affirmative defenses to B.K.'s federal discrimination claims, and, for the reasons expressed above we will estop B.K. from avoiding her promise to waive/release those claims here.
Our Court of Appeals has summarized the jurisprudence regarding summary judgment by noting that it "should only be granted if `there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.' Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is "genuine" if a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the non-movant. A dispute is material if it could affect the outcome of the case. In considering the record, we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir.2012) (internal citations omitted).
Pennsylvania law recognizes a release of claims as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Pa. R. Civ. P. 1030 (listing "release" and "waiver" as affirmative defenses); Blumenstock v. Gibson, 811 A.2d 1029, 1039 (Pa.Super.Ct.2002). For releases to be enforceable they must be "clear and unambiguous" and the language must "be specific and particular to the legal rights" subject to waiver. Ecksel v. Orleans Construction Co., 360 Pa.Super. 119, 519 A.2d 1021, 1025 (1987). Moreover, "[e]vidence that the parties actually negotiated the release will tend to indicate that the purchaser made a knowing waiver of his or her rights." Id. We are to apply "traditional contract principles to releases, including the policy of effectuating the intention of the parties via enforcement of the ordinary meaning of release terms." Maloney v. Valley Medical Facilities, Inc., 603 Pa. 399, 984 A.2d 478, 481 (2009); Clark v. Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, 693 A.2d 202, 207 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997). Of course, the interpretation of a contract is a question of law. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Del. River Port Auth., 880 A.2d 628, 631-32 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005).
B.K. has not cited any material differences between the September 28, 2009 settlement agreement draft that Gran prepared after their porch conversation and the October 15, 2013 draft that the District returned to Gran and that Gran forwarded to B.K. We will therefore focus on the parties' most recent iteration of the unobjected-to relevant release language. That language constitutes "clear and unambiguous"
Section 3C of the October 15, 2009 draft provided:
H1 SD-11 at 4 of 7.
Section 4 of the October 15, 2009 draft provided:
Id. at 4-5 of 7.
Four prefatory points are warranted here. First, B.K. cannot complain that our "enforcement by estoppel" of her promise to waive/release certain claims exceeds our limited subject matter jurisdiction as a federal court. The parties do not dispute that a federal district court's enforcement of anything tantamount to an IDEA settlement agreement ordinarily exceeds the scope of federal jurisdiction absent an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. See L.M. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-4855, 2011 WL 71442, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 7, 2011) (Bartle, J.) (collecting cases). We have an independent basis for federal jurisdiction to "enforce" this agreement here because the District raises the enforceability of the waiver/release provisions as an affirmative defense, not as a direct enforcement action, and we have jurisdiction over B.K.'s federal discrimination claims pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Second, B.K. cannot complain that our estoppel holding as it relates to the waiver/release agreement works an injustice in light of the District's failed attempt to satisfy the majority school board vote requirement, 24 Pa. Stat. § 5-508. Although the positive law bar to the enforceability of any contract is something that the Pennsylvania courts warn contracting parties to avoid, the concerns that animate those opinions are absent here because the District seeks to honor, not disclaim, its obligations under the draft agreements it exchanged with B.K. Our Court of Appeals has also recognized that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that "`[a]lthough it is the general rule that estoppel against the government will not lie where the acts of its agents are in violation of positive law, ... this rule cannot be slavishly applied where doing so would result in a fundamental injustice.'" Wayne Moving & Storage of N.J., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Pa., 625 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting Chester Extended Care Ctr. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 526 Pa. 350, 586 A.2d 379, 383 (1991)). This is exactly the situation here. To be sure, parents and public school districts alike may both find themselves on the losing side of a promissory estoppel claim. Put another way, the District cannot invoke promissory estoppel and then attempt to hide behind § 5-508 in every circumstance to shield itself from such a claim.
Third, the law of the case doctrine "bars courts from reconsidering matters actually decided", especially since our findings were based on a fully developed and augmented record that exhaustively explored all relevant factual issues. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 69 (3d Cir.1999). When "a court decides upon a rule of law, that
As evidenced by our findings of fact on the estoppel issue that Congress has authorized us to render, we have concluded that B.K. made changes to the waiver and release provisions through her counsel thereby altering the contractual language to her terms. Moreover, B.K. herself waited for nearly seven months before expressing any concern about the waiver/release provisions. Indeed, we found that B.K. expressed no disagreement with her counsel's release-language. This "indicat[es] that [B.K.] made a knowing waiver of ... her rights." See Ecksel, 519 A.2d at 1025.
With these threshold considerations in mind, we turn to the heart of the question of contract law before us. B.K.'s complaint in Civil Action No. 12-4066 asserts: (1) a denial of a FAPE for the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 school years, (2) a Section 504 claim alleging that the District (a) refused to provide I.K. with school books, (b) improperly disciplined him during late February 2009, (c) failed to take action in response to a claim that I.K. was bullied at his bus stop by non-disabled peers, and (d) refused to provide I.K. with any new IEP after March of 2009, and (3) an Americans with Disabilities Act claim coextensive with the section 504 claim.
In light of the waiver/release provision language quoted above, there can be no doubt that B.K.'s claims raised in Civil Action No. 12-4066 fall within the scope of sections 3C, 4A, and 4B of the October 15, 2009 draft that we have held her to be estopped from disclaiming. Consequently, the waiver/release provisions preclude B.K. from asserting the claims she brings against the District here.
As to the FAPE claims raised in part (d) of B.K.'s Section 504 and ADA claims related to the 2009-2010 school year, and the hearing officer's FAPE determinations that B.K. sought to appeal in her motion for judgment on the administrative record, Section 3C "waive[s] any rights the STUDENT might otherwise have had to obtain a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) from the DISTRICT, through August 31, 2010, and ... waive[s] any rights the STUDENT might otherwise have had to obtain an evaluation from the DISTRICT, [and] have the DISTRICT develop an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for the STUDENT ... through August 31, 2010." Since these IDEA and discrimination claims fall within the plain language of this provision, B.K. is barred from asserting those claims here. H1 SD-11 at 4 of 7.
As to B.K.'s 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 IDEA claims, her right to bring these claims is foreclosed by her estopped-fromavoiding release of claims against the District for any failure to "provide educational services to STUDENT, through August 31, 2010 and until such time as PARENTS reenroll STUDENT in the DISTRICT..., including specifically any EDUCATION CLAIMS arising after the date of this AGREEMENT", where such claims include the "fail[ure] to provide educational
And regardless of the time B.K.'s school books and bullying claims accrued, the waiver/release provisions unequivocally bar her from bringing any "EDUCATION CLAIMS" "arising from the beginning of time through the date of this AGREEMENT", H1 SD-11 § 4A, and "any EDUCATION CLAIMS arising after the date of this AGREEMENT", id. § 4B, where "EDUCATION CLAIMS" are defined as section 504 and ADA claims that "arise[] out of, by reason of, in connection with or as a result of STUDENT's status as a DISTRICT resident of school-age and any obligation of the RELEASED ENTITIES to the FAMILY arising from that status". Id. at § 4A. Because these claims presuppose that I.K.'s Section 504 and ADA rights flow from the District's duties as the default provider of educational services absent a home schooling agreement (as exists here), these claims also fall within the release's heartland.
B.K. is therefore estopped from avoiding her waiver and release of all claims at issue here in the implied contract we have found to exist pursuant to the District's promissory estoppel claim for relief. The District is therefore entitled to summary judgment in its favor on B.K.'s discrimination claims. Because we need not reach the merits of B.K.'s discrimination claims, we will deny as moot her motion for partial summary judgment.
And in light of our enforcement by estoppel of these waiver/release terms, we must deny as moot B.K.'s motion for partial summary judgment on her waived and/or released discrimination claims and deny as moot plaintiff's motion for judgment on the administrative record because she waived those claims. We must also vacate the hearing officer's 2012 decision because there was no need for the hearing officer to engage in any FAPE determinations because B.K. is estopped from avoiding her waiver/release of her FAPE claims here.
We will thus grant in part and deny in part the District's motion to supplement the administrative record and motion for summary judgment. We hold that although no valid settlement agreement existed between the parties, the District has succeeded on its equitable claim that promissory estoppel makes B.K.'s promises to settle I.K.'s IDEA and discrimination claims enforceable under the record as augmented.
We also conclude that the District is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of waiver and release, the affirmative defenses it pled in its answer to B.K.'s complaint in C.A. No. 12-4066. We therefore affirm the hearing officer's 2011 Decision but vacate her 2012 Decision in its entirety. Because we conclude that B.K. has waived and/or released the District from liability for the IDEA and discrimination claims she advances in her complaint, we will deny as moot B.K.'s motion for judgment on the administrative record and motion
AND NOW, this 14th day of August, 2013, upon consideration of defendant the School District of Haverford Township's ("the District") motion to supplement the administrative record (docket entry # 10), plaintiff I.K., by and through his parent and educational decision maker, B.K.'s (collectively, "B.K.") response in opposition thereto, B.K.'s motion for partial summary judgment (docket entry # 15), the District's motion for judgment on the administrative record and motion for summary judgment (docket entry # 16), B.K.'s motion for judgment on the administrative record (docket entry # 23), the District's omnibus response in opposition to B.K.'s motions, B.K.'s response in opposition to the District's motion for judgment on the administrative record and motion for summary judgment (docket entry # 26), the parties' reply briefs, the parties' supplemental briefing on the motion to supplement the administrative record (docket entries ## 37 & 38), the August 5, 2013 evidentiary hearing, and upon the analysis detailed in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. The District's motion to supplement the administrative record (docket entry # 10) is GRANTED and the record will be supplemented with the testimony of Judith A. Gran, Esq. and B.K., who testified in open court on August 5, 2013;
2. The District's motion for judgment on the administrative record and motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART (docket entry # 16);
3. The hearing officer's 2011 Decision, ODR # 00803/09-10 KE (July 8, 2011), is AFFIRMED and her 2012 Decision, ODR #2158/10-11 KE (April 18, 2012), is VACATED;
4. B.K.'s motion for partial summary judgment (docket entry # 15) is DENIED AS MOOT;
5. B.K.'s motion for judgment on the administrative record (docket entry # 23) is DENIED AS MOOT; and
6. The Clerk shall CLOSE this matter statistically.
AND NOW, this 14th day of August, 2013, in accordance with the accompanying Order granting defendant School District of Haverford Township's motion for judgment on the administrative record and motion for summary judgment, JUDGMENT IS ENTERED in favor of defendant School District of Haverford Township and against plaintiffs I.K., by and through his parent and educational decision maker, B.K.
References to "H1" cite the record in the administrative proceeding recorded at I.K v. Haverford Township School District, ODR No. 00803/09-10. The entire "H1" record appears on the docket in C.A. No. 10-4397 at docket entry #30. "H1 NT" refers to the notes of testimony in that hearing; "H1 SD#" refers to a school district exhibit submitted at that hearing and these are collected at Ex. 10 of the administrative record; and "H1 Ex. 4 (2011 Decision)" refers to the hearing officer's July 8, 2011 Decision. References to "H2" cite the administrative record in I.K. v. Haverford Township School District, ODR No. 2158/11-12. The entire "H2" record appears on the docket in C.A. No. 10-4397 at docket entry # 14. References to "Aug. 5, 2013 NT" cite the August 5, 2013 hearing testimony and "Aug. 5, 2013 Def. Ex." cite exhibits entered into evidence at that hearing.
Though B.K. asserted that we lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the merits of the District's first civil action (C.A. No. 11-6040) in her first affirmative defense to the complaint, that issue is now moot in light of the subsequently completed administrative review proceedings that undeniably vest us with jurisdiction here. We also note that B.K.'s jurisdictional defense could be construed as a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. ("The hearing officer is currently hearing the merits of the case.... Consequently, the [District's] appeal is premature").
Moreover, where the issue before a court is a question of law like promissory estoppel, see Stonehedge Sq. Ltd. Partnership v. Movie Merchants, Inc., 454 Pa.Super. 468, 685 A.2d 1019, 1024 & n. 3 (1996), and the record is fully developed, a specialized administrative hearing is of little utility. See Pardini, 420 F.3d at 192 n. 13 ("`Where the factual record is fully-developed and no evidentiary disputes remain, the court can and should decide legal issues.'" (quoting Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir.1990))); Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770, 774 (1st Cir. 1981) (reasoning that the aims of exhaustion are inapplicable where "[t]he issue may be a pure matter of law as to which specialized administrative understanding plays little role").
